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a b s t r a c t 
We assess to what extent decisions taken by the Federal Reserve in setting interest rates can be inter- 
preted in the light of monetary policy rules that are either built on standard objectives of output and 
price stabilization or based on alternative objectives of financial stability and regulation of the solvency 
conditions in the economic system. This goal is pursued through a comparison between the “Taylor rule”
in its “original” and “augmented” versions, and an alternative “Solvency rule”. We use nonperforming 
loans as a proxy for the conditions of financial stability and solvency in the system. The empirical in- 
vestigation is carried out following a structural vector autoregressive approach that exploits a statistical 
identification procedure. In this way, we are able to identify the causal structure among variables without 
imposing theoretical restrictions on the model. Our empirical findings provide very limited and incom- 
plete support for the Taylor rule in its various forms while give comprehensive evidence in favor of the 
alternative Solvency rule. 
© 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
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0. Introduction 
The pillars of macroeconomic theory have been violently
haken by the so called great recession: an “earthquake” — as it
as defined — able to tear apart many of the certainties perme-
ting the discipline ( Christiano, 2017 ). This applies to the specific
eld of monetary policy as well. As a matter of fact, the efficacy
f central banks’ intervention, their fundamental goals, even the
eneral role they are deemed to have in the economic system have
een object of an intense debate. This new ferment of ideas is also
oticeable in the discussion on the so-called “rules” of behavior of
entral banks. In the present work we intend to contribute to this
ebate by analysing if and to what extents the decisions taken
uring three decades by the U.S. Federal Reserve in setting the
nterest rates can be effectively interpreted in the light of those✩ We are grateful to two anonymous referees of this journal for their useful com- 
ents. The usual disclaimers apply. 
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te), a.moneta@santannapisa.it (A. Moneta). 
F  
i  
l  
i  
t  
s  
w  
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.strueco.2020.02.001 
954-349X/© 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. onetary policy rules which are built on the standard objectives
f output and price stabilization, or rather should be examined in
he light of the scopes of financial stability and regulation of the
olvency conditions in the economic system. 
This analysis is conducted through a comparison between the
Taylor rule” in its “original” ( Taylor, 1993 ) and “augmented” (see
äfer, 2014 , and references therein) versions, and an alternative
iew called “Solvency rule” ( Brancaccio and Fontana, 2013; 2016;
rancaccio and Suppa, 2018 ). 
We empirically assess the theoretical causal relations implied
y these rules on the basis of a structural vector autoregressive
pproach which adopts a specific statistical identification proce-
ure and avoids, as much as possible, assumptions derived from
conomic theory. By adopting this procedure we look at the United
tates in order to verify whether the actual monetary policy of the
ederal Reserve during the period 1988–2016 can be more easily
nterpreted in the light of the causal relations implied by the “Tay-
or rule” or is more in line with the alternative nexus formalized
n the “Solvency rule”. Our analysis is therefore of a positive rather
han a normative nature. In other words, neither do we intend to
uggest what the central bank should do or are we interested in
hat the central bank claims to do (see for instance Romer and
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b  Romer, 1989 ). Our research is limited only to verifying which mon-
etary policy rule is more consistent with the causal relationships
among variables which emerge from the available data, regardless
of the more or less explicit purposes of the monetary authority. 
In this work, we introduce a new variable rarely covered
in the literature on policy “rules” (for a partial exception, see
Zilberman and Tayler, 2014 ): nonperforming loans, which we will
consider either as a macroprudential indicator in the “augmented”
version of the Taylor rule or as proxy of the solvency conditions
in the “Solvency rule”. With respect to the method to identify
the causal relationships among the variables of interest we use
structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models. Structural models
allow to analyse causal relationships in more details with respect
of reduced-form models, but usually they have the disadvantage of
relying on a priori assumptions. In this paper, however, we apply
a statistical procedure for identification, which is based on inde-
pendent component analysis ( Moneta et al., 2013 ) and eschews, as
much as possible, economic-theoretic assumptions. This allows us
to empirically identify, under the assumptions of non-Gaussianity
and independence of structural shocks, the contemporaneous
causal structure, the structural impulse response functions, and
the forecast variance decomposition. This data-driven technique
is, in our opinion, particularly appropriate for comparative exer-
cises, where the aim is to analyse different relationships between
variables that arise from alternative theoretical interpretations of
monetary policy. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly
describes some features of the main debate on monetary policy
goals and related “rules” and compare them with a possi-
ble alternative view based on the concept of “Solvency rule”.
Section 3 proposes a simple comparative scheme of the competing
interpretations of monetary policy and the related causal relation-
ships based either on the “Taylor rule” or on the “solvency rule”.
Section 4 clarifies the way in which this work analyses the causal-
ity between the variables at play. Section 5 describes the data we
use in our empirical analysis. Section 6 presents the structural
VAR framework and the identification strategy. Section 7 shows
the results. Section 8 concludes. 
2. Current debates on financial stability in the taylor rule and 
a possible alternative view 
A relevant problem in the current debate on monetary policy
concerns whether or not it is necessary to assign to central banks
the task of contributing to the financial stability of the economic
system. The multiple sides of this issue have been tackled from
many different viewpoints (Akerlof et al., 2014 ; Blanchard et al.,
2010; Blot et al., 2015; Borio, 2008; 2014; Claessens and Haber-
meier, 2013 ; IMF, 2015, see) . From the analytic point of view, the
debate has focused on the need to assess if the monetary policy
“rules” usually applied to analyse central banks’ behaviour are
also able to pursue the goal of financial stability. The evaluation
was primarily directed towards the renowned “Taylor rule” ( Taylor,
1993; 1999 ). Such rule describes the way in which the central
bank can set the rate of interest according to deviation of inflation
and output from their respective “equilibrium” levels, in order to
pursue the minimization of such gaps in the business cycle: the
lower output and inflation with respect to the equilibrium levels,
the lower will have to be the interest rate needed to push them
up, and vice versa. In the view of the scholar who invented it, the
Taylor rule implicitly targets the goal of financial stability as well:
sticking to the rule would guarantee a balanced financial develop-
ment, whereas deviations from the rule may set up the premises
for the outbreak of a financial crisis. In short, according to Tay-
lor, his “rule” allows the central bank to preserve the financial
stability not simply by virtue of the possibility to move GDP andnflation up or down, but because it allows to stabilize their values
round precise equilibrium levels, which ultimately correspond
o the “natural” equilibrium determined by the “fundamentals”
f preferences, technology and scarce resources that are typical
f neoclassical theory. On the basis of this interpretation, it has
een argued that the credit boom which anticipated the recession
tarted in 2008 would have been caused by the decision taken by
he Federal Reserve to set the interest rate well below the path
uggested by the Taylor rule ( Taylor, 20 09a; 20 09b ). According to
his view, then, not only would the Taylor rule be able to ensure
he stability of inflation and output, but also financial stability.
his interpretation, however, has found wide opposition, even
mong the appraisers of the rule. For instance, some of them
laim that an “augmented” version of the Taylor rule should have
o be applied, if one is to analyse past financial crises and in order
o prevent them to happen again. Such augmented rules, besides
argeting output and price stability, would require a direct control
f credit dynamics or other macroprudential indicators, to avoid
he occurrence of episodes of financial instability ( Agénor et al.,
013; Akerlof et al., 2014; Beau et al., 2012; Bhar and Malliaris,
016; Blanchard et al., 2010; Gambacorta and Signoretti, 2014;
rug, 2015; Mattesini and Becchetti, 2009; Ozkan and Unsal, 2014;
mets, 2014; Verona et al., 2014 ), (see Tamborini, 2010 , for a
ifferent point of view). For example, this would mean that facing
n excessive amount of credit or an excessive rise in equity prices,
he monetary authority would be led to increase the interest rate
o “cool down” the system and avert financial turbulence. In a
utshell, this is a description of what goes under the name of
leaning against the wind” monetary policy, which has gained a
rowing interest in recent years. As we shall see, in this paper
e consider nonperforming loans as a possible macroprudential
ndicator within the “augmented Taylor rule”. 
The debate on the relation between the Taylor rule and the
cope of financial stability is still open, and many scholars and
olicy makers are involved (see Akerlof et al., 2014; Blanchard
t al., 2010; Käfer, 2014 ). It is worth mentioning that though they
dvocate different sets of criteria considered to be relevant to
reserve financial stability, the scholars involved in the discussion
sually do not make objections on a double causal relation which
s typical of the Taylor rule and of the other conventional rules of
onetary policy: in fact, they firstly accept that the central bank
s deemed to set the interest rate as a function of the deviations
f the GDP from its “equilibrium” level and of inflation from its
target” level; secondly, they accept that in setting the interest
ate in this way, the central bank is then thought to be always
ffective in affecting those gaps. The latter relation, however, has
ot always fared well when it comes to empirical testing: it is
ctually not certain that the manipulation of the interest rate is
ffective in managing the performance of GDP and inflation. In
he last few years this causal relation has been put into question
ost notably by the issue of the zero lower bound. Yet the many
oubts on the validity of this relation are in fact widely known
ince long time and inspire critiques of a more general character.
utstanding within these critiques the idea that the influence
f the interest rate on investment, hence more generally on the
ggregate demand, often turns out to be weak, delayed, and, most
undamentally, uncertain ( Arestis and Sawyer, 2008; Bernanke and
ertler, 1995; Blinder and Maccini, 1991; Chirinko, 1993; Kriesler
nd Lavoie, 2007; Orphanides, 2001; Primiceri, 2005; Shapiro
t al., 1986; Sharpe and Suarez, 2015 ). 
The seldom satisfactory empirical evidence of a causal relation
rom the policy interest rate to aggregate demand, GDP and infla-
ion yields some implications in the debate on the validity of the
Taylor rule” and related interpretations of monetary policy. It also
rovides elements to support interpretations of the role of central
anks quite different from those suggested by the Taylor rule. In
E. Brancaccio, A. Califano and M. Lopreite et al. / Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 53 (2020) 127–136 129 
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iarticular, in recent years a renewed interest has been devoted
o the old “Radcliffe Report” ( Committee on the working of the
onetary system, 1959 ; for recent contributions on this subject,
ee Aikman et al. 2016 ). 
This highly articulated and in some aspects contradictory report
as been analysed and developed in various directions. Here we
ntend to focus on two aspects often neglected in the literature
ut highlighted by Kaldor (1960, 1985) . First, the Radcliffe Report
ot merely did question the old monetarist theory of a stable re-
ation between money and nominal income, but also raised strong
oubts on the ability of the interest rates and other monetary
olicy variables to govern aggregate demand, GDP and inflation.
econd, on the contrary, the Radcliffe Report claimed that inter-
st rate maneuvers and other monetary policy actions can have
ignificant repercussions on the stability and solvency of financial
nstitutions. One of the possible ways to interpret these indications
s as follows. The prior role of central banks does not lie in taking
harge of the management of the business cycle and of inflation,
s this management may be in fact out of their actual control. The
ain task assigned to monetary authorities would concern instead
he capacity of monetary policy to affect the sustainability of the
nancial positions in the economic system. Given the levels of
ncome, inflation, the stock of debt accumulated by households,
rms, banks and public institutions, their financial positions would
esult on average either more sustainable or less so, depending
n the actions taken by the central bank on the interest rates and
ther monetary variables. For instance, when income and inflation
re low with respect to due reimbursements of debt, private and
ublic debtors in the system will be in a fragile position and low
evel of the interest rates will be needed, so as to make refinancing
ossible and avoid a situation of insolvency. On the contrary, if in-
ome and inflation are high compared to reimbursements of debt,
ebtors positions will be safer and they will be able to deal with a
ighter interest rate policy. Thus, according to this vision, the prior
unction of central banks consists in preserving the stability of the
nancial setting, and more broadly in regulating the conflicting
elationships between creditors and debtors and then managing
he solvency conditions within the economic system. 
The just described interpretation suggests an idea of monetary
olicy in many ways discretionary and in any case quite complex,
hich could hardly be reduced to a mere mathematical “rule”
 Dow, 2017 ). Nonetheless, some basic aspects that can be traced
ack to this vision have recently been summarized in a formal-
zation which goes under the name of “Solvency rule” ( Brancaccio
nd Fontana, 2013; 2016; Brancaccio and Suppa, 2018 ). When
ompared with the “Taylor rule” and its variants, the “Solvency
ule” shows one formal similarity and several substantial differ-
nces. On the one hand, the “Solvency rule” does not rule out
he standard behavioural causal relation according to which the
entral bank sets the interest rate as a function of the GDP and the
nflation rate: the lower the GDP and the inflation, the lower the
nterest rate set by the central bank, and vice versa. On the other
and, among the determinants of the interest rate, the “Solvency
ule” also includes other variables which are meaningful in the
escription of the solvency conditions in the economic system,
nd most notably the nonperforming loans: the higher the level of
uch loans, the lower will be the rate of interest set by the mon-
tary authority. In addition, the “Solvency rule” does not depend
n the relevance of the causal relation which foresees the interest
ate to affect GDP and inflation. Rather, the “Solvency rule” sug-
ests another causal relation, according to which the interest rate
et by the central bank deploys its influence on those variables
epresenting the solvency conditions in the economic system: low
nterest rates should favour the drainage of nonperforming loans. 
In short, with respect to the standard “Taylor rule”, the “Sol-
ency rule” does not need to assume that the central banker islways able to contribute to the control of the business cycle and
f inflation. Furthermore, while the “augmented” version of the
Taylor rule” implies the monetary authority to adopt a “leaning
gainst the wind” behaviour in order to prevent a financial boom
o set on, the ‘Solvency rule” describes a central bank which in-
ervenes in the opposite direction, paying attention to the already
xisting financial positions with the goal of guaranteeing their
olvency. The interpretations described so far imply alternative
iews on the actual role assumed by central banks, relying on
lternative sets of causal relations between the variables at the
ore of the deployment of monetary policy. If we stick to the
Taylor rule”, the central bank pursues the goal of output and
rice stability, and this implicitly guarantees financial stability as
ell. According to the “augmented” version of the “Taylor rule”, it
s necessary to introduce further macroprudential variables among
he determinants of the rate of interest in order for the central
ank to target both GDP and price stability on the one hand and
nancial stability on the other. For the “Solvency rule” instead,
ather than meeting the target of output and price stability, the
entral bank can affect the financial positions of the economic
nits in the system by regulating their solvency. 
. Alternative rules of monetary policy: A comparative scheme 
We present now a simplified comparative scheme which aims
t describing in an immediate way the causal relations suggested
y the two competing interpretations of monetary policy described
efore. A discussion on their respective theoretical foundations,
hen, is beyond the scope of this work. The only basic theoretical
ifference that must be kept in mind here is that the concept of
equilibrium” that characterizes the “Taylor rule” is different from
hat which distinguishes the “Solvency rule”. In particular, as we
aid, the “equilibrium” values of GDP, interest rate, inflation and
onperforming loans that are in the “Taylor rule” refer to a situa-
ion of full employment which is typical of the standard neoclassi-
al growth and distribution models, possibly amended by the pres-
nce of asymmetries and market imperfections. On the contrary,
n the Solvency rule the relationships between the above variables
re completely different: the “equilibrium” values referred to can
e simply considered as “targets” of policy authorities, which
ay also correspond to situations of high unemployment caused
y lack of effective demand and independent of asymmetries or
arket imperfections (for an in-depth analysis, see Brancaccio and
ontana (2013) ). After this specification, we can describe a simple
cheme whose ambition is to compare the essential theoretical nu-
lei of the alternative interpretations of monetary policy examined.
s we shall see, this scheme can be thought as a sort of “stere-
gram”: depending on the different hypotheses on the exogenous
ariables or parameters, the same system of equations can de-
cribe the variety of causal relations the different monetary policy
ules considered are grounded (on the origins and possible appli-
ation of this comparative approach, see Dobb (1975) ; Dutt (1990) ;
ahn and Matthews (1964) ; Brancaccio (2010) ; Brancaccio and
alifano (2018) ; see also Blanchard and Brancaccio (2019) ). 
The variables considered in this exercise are the following: i t ,
t , y t and NPL t represent, respectively, the current values of the
nterest rate, inflation, production, and the amount of nonperform-
ng loans; i t − πt gives the current real interest rate and πt−1 is
he inflation in the previous period; r ∗, π ∗, y ∗ and NPL ∗ represent
equilibrium’ levels or ’policy targets’; finally, α, β , γ , , ω, σ , ρ ,
 are given parameters. The competing alternative interpretations
f monetary policy described so far can be both contained by a
nique system of equations: 
 t = r ∗ + πt + α(πt − π ∗) + β(y t − y ∗) + γ (NP L t − NP L ∗) (1) 
130 E. Brancaccio, A. Califano and M. Lopreite et al. / Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 53 (2020) 127–136 
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2  
O  
r  N P L t = N P L ∗ + [(i t − πt − y t ) − (r ∗ − y ∗)] (2)
y t = y ∗ + σ − ω(i t − πt ) (3)
πt = πt−1 + z + ρ(y t − y ∗) (4)
Eq. 1 can be representative of both a “Taylor rule” and a
“Solvency rule”. Within this equation, nonperforming loans can
be considered as a macroprudential variable capturing financial
stability in the “augmented” version of the “Taylor rule” or as a
proxy for the solvency condition of the economic system in the
“Solvency rule”. Eq. 2 is based on the hypothesis that the level of
nonperforming loans can be expressed as a function of the differ-
ence between the current real interest rate and the equilibrium’
real rate, and of the difference between current production and
the production of ‘equilibrium’: we can assume, in this sense, that
the higher the levels of production and inflation with respect to
the interest rates, the greater will be the nominal income of the
debtors with respect to the nominal value of the cost of their
debts, and therefore the lower will be the amount of nonper-
forming loans, and vice versa. Eq. 3 describes the performance of
production compared to its ‘equilibrium’ value as a function of an
autonomous component of aggregate demand and of the current
real interest rate. Eq. 4 expresses the current inflation rate depend-
ing on a cost component and on the deviations of output form
its ‘equilibrium’ value. Given the parameters and πt−1 from the
previous period, i t , π t , y t and NPL t are the unknowns. In all cases,
α, β , , σ , z have positive values while γ can change its sign. 
Assuming ω and ρ to be positive, the system describes the
causal relations typical of the Taylor rule, either in its original ver-
sion or in the augmented one, depending on the value assigned to
γ (respectively null or positive). In the case of the standard Taylor
rule, Eqs. 1, 3, 4 determine the unknown i t , y t , π t simultaneously,
and then Eq. 2 determines NPL t as a residual. When we look at the
augmented Taylor rule, the four equations determine simultaneusly
the four unknowns. If we assume instead that ω and ρ are null (or
negligible) and that γ is negative, the system describes the causal
relations at the basis of the ‘Solvency rule’: in this case, Eq. 3 de-
termines y t , Eq. 4 determines π t and then 1 and 2 determine
simultaneusly i t and NPL t . It is clear that the causal relationships
suggested by the different ”rules” are completely different. 
Some of the simplifying hypotheses of the just described
comparative scheme are inspired by a teaching model suggested
by Taylor (20 0 0) . Obviously, the same scheme can be made more
complex by introducing micro and macro determinants of the
different visions examined, new hypotheses on the expectations,
different temporal lags for the variables, and so on. In any case
the fundamental relations suggested by the alternative views
would not change. Then, we can test the empirical reliability of
these different causal relations. The following paragraphs will be
devoted to this objective. 
4. A data-driven analysis of causality 
Preliminary to the empirical analysis, some clarifying remarks
are needed on the meaning that we attach, within the scope of
this work, to the concept of causal relation and to the method we
will apply in order to test it empirically. 
In recent years many ideas on causation developed in the
philosophy of science and machine learning community have been
applied to econometrics, where directed graphs are used to repre-
sent causal relations. According to Pearl (2009) , a functional causal
model is a system of equations in which each equation represents
a distinct and autonomous causal mechanism; this means that it
is possible to modify a single mechanism (and the correspondingquation) without changing the other causal relationships in the
ystem. In this case, the intervention consists in assigning a new
alue to a variable, substituting this new value in all the equations
n which the variable occurs but leaving the structure and the
oefficients of the equations unaltered. Pearl’s assumption is that
he variables that change their value under this intervention will
o so only due to the effect of the considered variable. Finally,
he causal influence can be measured through a linear regression
odel in which by manipulating the independent variables we
an analyse the changes of the dependent variable. In this way
ot only can we capture the correlations between variables but
e can also measure the ‘marginal effect’, which indicates how
uch y changes when x increases and in which direction. The
rucial question in this framework is, not surprisingly, how it is
ossible to learn about causal relationships (constituting func-
ional causal models) starting from the data and under general
ssumptions that only minimally depend on economic theory.
earl (2009) and Spirtes et al. (20 0 0) propose to use graphical
ausal models not only for the sake of representation but also of
nference, under some principles that connect causal structures to
robability distributions. This line of research has been recently
xpanded by the application of independent component analysis
ICA) ( Comon, 1994 ). In particular, under general assumptions
n the data generating process (existence of independent shocks
ffecting the system, non-Gaussianity, recursiveness, and linearity),
himizu et al. (2006) propose an ICA-based search algorithm that
earn a causal structure from non-experimental data. Our method
o assess the causal implications of the different monetary policy
ules described in the previous section proceeds consistently with
his strand of literature. We start from the estimation of a Vector
utoregressive (VAR) model, that is an econometric framework
ble to cope with a set of time series data, and we address the
dentification problem by applying ICA. The structural VAR model
s recovered following a statistical method that allow to estimate
oth the contemporaneous causal structure and the the dynamic
ausal effects among the variables. 
There is an established tradition in applying structural VAR
odel to study monetary policy decisions and their effects
n macroeconomic variables ( Bernanke and Mihov (1998) ;
hristiano et al. (1999) ; Sims (1986) ; Uhlig (2005) ), trying to
isentangle both the contemporaneous and dynamic causal effects.
tructural VAR models have been applied to identify mone-
ary policy rules by Choi and Wen (2010) , Sousa (2010) , and
ociecki et al. (2012) . These studies, however, use identification
trategies that strongly hinges on a priori assumptions. 
Our goal in the present work is to compare the different
nterpretations of monetary policy and the corresponding causal
elations as described so far by assessing their relevance through a
ata-driven empirical analysis, in which identification is achieved
ot by imposing restrictions derived from economic theory,
ut rather through general assumptions on the statistical and
tructural properties of the data generating process. 
Following Capasso and Moneta (2016) ; Gourieroux et al. (2017) ;
yvärinen and Oja (20 0 0) ; Lanne et al. (2017) ; Moneta et al.
2011, 2013) , our study is focused on the ICA-based empirical
dentification of SVAR models on the basis of the following general
ssumptions: (i) the shocks that affect the system are mutually
ndependent and non-Gaussian; (ii) the contemporaneous causal
tructure is recursive. 
. Data 
We use quarterly US data, covering the period from 1988:Q1 to
016:Q4. The sample span is determined by the data availability.
ur variables of interest are the following: the federal funds
ate ( FFR ); the real GDP (2009 dollars), in logarithms ( GDP ); the
E. Brancaccio, A. Califano and M. Lopreite et al. / Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 53 (2020) 127–136 131 
Fig. 1. This figure shows the series of federal funds rate (FFR), log real gross domestic product (GDP), inflation (PI), real interest rate (RFFR), and log nonperforming loans 
(NPL). 
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B  rice inflation, calculated as the annual rate of change of the
mplicit price deflator GDP ( PI ); the real federal funds rate, i.e.
FR minus PI ( RFFR ) 1 ; the total amount of nonperforming loans
or commercial banks, in logarithms ( NPL ). The data are drawn
rom the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database. 2 All the
eries taken from this database are quarterly data, except for the
ederal funds rate that is monthly. To transform the federal funds
ate in quarterly observation we simply take the arithmetic mean
ver three months. Fig. 1 plot the series of the data. From eye
nspection already, the series look non-stationary. As shown in the
ubsections below, the non stationarity of all series is confirmed
y a battery of unit root tests: the Dickey Fuller (ADF), the Phillips
erron (PP), and the Kwiatkowski Phillips Schmidt Shin (KPSS)
ests, in all cases at 5% level of significance. 
. Estimation and identification method 
Vector autoregressive models were introduced by
ims (1980) to describe macroeconomic dynamics by treating
ll variables as potentially endogenous. The point of departure in
AR analysis is the specification and estimation of a reduced form1 We thus follow the Fisher’s equation similarly to King et al. (1991) . 
2 In particular, we downloaded from the FRED website ( https://fred.stlouisfed.org) 
he following codes: FEDFUNDS (source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
ystem), GDPC1 and GDPDEF (source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis), USNP 
source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council). 
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  odel: 
 t = μt + A 1 y t−1 + . . . + A p y t−p + u t , (5)
here y t = (y 1 t , . . . , y kt ) ′ is a vector of k time series variables, the
 i ( i = 1 , . . . , p) are ( k × k ) coefficient matrices, and u t = (u 1 t , . . . ,
 kt ) 
′ is a k -dimensional zero mean white noise process with
ovariance matrix E(u t u 
′ 
t ) = u . The vector μt is a deterministic
art, which in many cases is simply equal to a vector of constants.
Eq. (5) is an approximate description of the unobserved data
enerating process (DGP), whose adequacy can be checked with
he typical criteria of model selection and model checking, such
s, for example, sequential testing procedure, Akaike or Schwarz’s
nformation criteria for selecting the VAR order (i.e. p ), and tests
or residual autocorrelation (see Lütkepohl, 2005 ). An important
eature of the reduced form model (5) is that it omits the fact that
here might be mutual influences among the contemporaneous
ariables (within the period of observation) among y 1 t , . . . , y kt . This
mission is done in order to keep the variables on the right hand
ide of the equation as pre-determined and hence getting consis-
ent estimation of the coefficients through simple linear regression.
ut, precisely because of this omission, the coefficients being esti-
ated cannot be interpreted as genuine causal influences. 
Structural VAR analysis attempts to identify structural, i.e.
ausally meaningful, relations among the variables. The structural
AR model lets the (unobserved) coefficients that describe the
ontemporaneous causal influence to appear in the equation: 
0 y t = νt + 1 y t−1 + . . . + p y t−p + ε t , (6)
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Table 1 
Unit root tests. 
Variables Lags ADF test (test statistic) KPSS test (test statistic) b PP test (test statistic) Results 
GDP d 2 −1.45 0.85 −0.74 I(1) 
NPL a,c 5 −1.65 1.06 −1.07 I(1) 
PI a,c 5 −3.01 0.15 −2.47 I(1) 
RFFR d 2 −2.73 0.19 −2.11 I(1) 
Notes: a,c The critical value (ADF, PP statistic test) for PI and NPL at the 5% level of significance is equal to −2.89 and at the 
1% level of significance is equal to −3.49. b The critical value of KPSS statistic test for PI is equal to 0.14 at the 5% level of 
significance and it is equal to 0.21 at the 1% level of significance. The critical value for NPL is equal to 0.46 at the 5% level of 
significance and it is equal to 0.73 at the 1% level of significance. d The critical value (ADF, PP statistic test) for the Real GDP 
and RFFR is equal to −3.44 at the 5% level of significance and it is equal to −4.04 at the 1% level of significance. b The critical 
value of KPSS statistic test for the Real GDP and RFFR is equal to 0.15 at the 5% level of significance and it is equal to 0.21 at 
the 1% level of significance. 
Table 2 
Johansen test. 
Variables Lags H 0 λ stat trace λ stat max Results 
GDP, NPL, PI, RFFR 2 r = 0 56.54 (0.0053) 31.83 (0.0106) Cointegrated 
r = 1 24.71 (0.18) 13.48 (0.42) 
Notes: The p-values are shown in parentheses. 
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Fig. 2. Contemporaneous causal structure, output of the LiNGAM algorithm. where 0 is a ( k × k ) matrix reflecting the instantaneous relations,
and the i ( i = 1 , . . . , p) are the coefficient matrices of the lagged
structural relations, reflecting causal influences present in the DGP.
Again, the vector ε t = (ε 1 t , . . . , εkt ) ′ is a k -dimensional zero mean
white noise process with covariance matrix E( ε t ε ′ t ) = ε , and νt 
is the deterministic or constant part. In standard structural VAR
analysis ε is assumed to be diagonal, i.e. correlations among εit 
(over i = 1 , . . . , k ) are zero. This is also equivalent to stating that
the εit are orthogonal (conditional on the εit having a mean of
zero). Besides assuming orthogonality and uncorrelatedness, we
assume that εit is independent of εjt for each i, j = 1 , . . . , k ( i  = j ).
The independence assumption is consistent with the interpre-
tation of the elements of ε t as structural shocks, i.e. exogenous
processes that affect each variable of the system at each time
with the important feature that each term influences each variable
in its own independent way. While in a setting with normally
distributed error terms the distinction between independence and
uncorrelatedness does not matter, in a non-Gaussian setting this
further specification is crucial (see Hyvärinen and Oja, 20 0 0 ). 
It is also assumed that the diagonal elements of 0 are equal
to one (or that the system can always be rescaled in order to have
ones in the main diagonal of 0 ). Let B = I − 0 . Thus Eq. (6) can
be rewritten as 
y t = νt + By t + 1 y t−1 + . . . + p y t−p + ε t (7)
Eq. (7) cannot be directly estimated by linear regression
because not all the variables on the right hand side are prede-
termined or exogenous: some elements of y t may instantaneously
(i.e. within the period of observation) cause other elements of
y t , without knowing which one. The relationship between the
reduced form (see Eq. 5 ) and the structural model (see Eq. 6 or
7 ) is evident by pre-multiplying equation (6) or (7) by −1 
0 
or
(I − B ) −1 . We have that −1 
0 
i = A i ( i = 1 , . . . , p), −1 0 νt = μt 
and −1 
0 
ε t = u t . The problem of identification consists in the
fact that, having estimated the reduced form model we cannot
directly recover the structural form model, because there are more
parameters in Eq. (6) than in equation (5) . 
Structural VAR analysis is focused on imposing restrictions on
0 so that it can be retrieved from the data. The matrices i 
( i = 1 , . . . , p), in turn, can be recovered from 0 joint with the A i
which are obtained from the estimation of Eq. (5) . The restrictions
on 0 are usually derived from theoretical or institutional knowl-
edge, or placed on the basis of considerations about the long-run
effects or signs of the shocks. In this paper instead, we apply andentification method focused on inferring the contemporaneous
ausal structure on the basis of the study of the reduced-form
esiduals. We adopt here the approach based on independent
omponent analysis proposed by Moneta et al. (2013) . Since this
pproach has been designed for non-Gaussian variables, in case of
eparture from non-normality we also check the robustness of the
esults under different approaches, in particular the search method
ased on graphical causal models (see Moneta et al., 2013 ). 
. Results 
We estimate two different SVAR models. In a first model, that
e call the real interest rate model, the vector y t (see Eqs. 6 and
 ) consists of the following variables: RFFR, PI, GDP, NPL (as defined
n the previous section). A second model, that we call the nominal
nterest rate model, is identical to the first one, except that RFFR
s replaced with FFR . The difference between the two models
elates to the possibility or not of making explicit the monetary
olicy rule in terms of interest rate net of inflation directly. In the
iterature it is possible to find both formulations in a wide range
f analytical contexts (see for instance King et al. (1991) ). Anyhow,
s we shall see, from our tests it turns out that the estimation
esults of the two models do not make significant differences in
erms of our answers to the research questions. Thus we present
etailed and numerical results for the real interest rate model
nly, but we will flag the similarities and the few differences with
espect to the results of the nominal interest rate model. 
Table 1 shows that the four series ( RFFR, PI, GDP, NPL ) turn
ut to be non-stationary, and in particular integrated of order one
 I (1)). Table 2 shows the results of the Johansen cointegration test
see Johansen, 1991 ), which suggests to not reject the presence of
E. Brancaccio, A. Califano and M. Lopreite et al. / Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 53 (2020) 127–136 133 
Fig. 3. Impulse response functions with 90% confidence bounds of real interest rate, inflation, real GDP and nonperforming loans. 
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3 When the components are Gaussian uncorrelatedness implies independence 
and we can estimate the mixing matrix only up to an arbitrary orthogonal matrix. 
For non-Gaussian variables, on the other hand,uncorrelatedness and independence 
are not equivalent. The ICA estimation is performed by finding uncorrelated com- 
ponents that maximize non-Gaussianity ( Hyvärinen and Oja, 20 0 0 ). Moreover, com- 
bining the assumption of acyclicity with non Gaussianity (i.e LINGAM) we obtain a 
perfect identifiability of the model ( Shimizu et al., 2006 ) 
4 Note that the recursiveness assumption allows the matching between variables 
and shocks because this assumption implies a certain number of zero in the matri- 
ces B and −1 0 . This means that one shock is affecting k variables, another shock is 
affecting k − 1 variables, and so on. The LiNGAM algorithm exploits this fact to find 
the exact matching ( Shimizu et al., 2006 ). ne cointegrating relationship among the variables. With regard to
he nominal interest rate model, also FFR turns out to be I (1) and,
sing Johansen test, we also get one cointegrating relationship. 
In order to exploit the non-Gaussian feature of the data and
aintain the possibility of estimating the model with least ab-
olute deviation (LAD), which is more robust to extreme events
characteristics of the recent economic crisis), we estimate the
odel in levels. The use of the LAD estimator was also proposed
y Moneta et al. (2013) in a non-Gaussian SVAR framework. We
elect two lags under the Bayesian (BIC) and the Hannan-Quinn
HQC) information criterion for both models. 
We identify the matrix B of Eq. (7) , which represents the
ausal structure among the contemporaneous variables, using
he LiNGAM algorithm ( Shimizu et al., 2006 ). In a first step this
lgorithm applies ICA (in particular the FastICA algorithm by
yvarinen, 1999 ) to the reduced-form residuals u t (see Eq. 5 ),
nding a set of independent shocks, whose order and correspon-
ence with the variables are left underdetermined. ICA can be
pplied only if at most one of the reduced-form residuals turn
ut to be Gaussian. Applying normality test (Shapiro-Francia),
ormality is not rejected only for the residual corresponding to
nflation ( PI ) in both the real and nominal interest rate model. 
In a second step, under the assumption of recursiveness, the
lgorithm matches shocks and variables, producing both the Bnd the vector ε t (see Eq. 7 ). The assumption of recursiveness
eans that the contemporaneous causal structure does not display
eedback loops (cycles). In other words, it can be represented with
 directed causal graph. Assuming that there is a recursive causal
tructure means also that in principle the system is identifiable
sing a Cholesky decomposition of the reduced-form residuals,
nder an appropriate causal order. 3 . 
Thus our method is also compatible with the traditional SVAR
dentification scheme ( Sims, 1980 ), with the crucial difference that
he causal order is not imposed a priori, but inferred from the
ata (for more details on the application of the LiNGAM algorithm
o the SVAR framework see Moneta et al., 2013 ). 4 
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Fig. 4. Forecast variance decomposition of real interest rate, inflation, real GDP and nonperforming loans. 
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p  Fig. 2 shows the directed acyclic graph of the contempora-
neous causal structure derived from our estimation of matrix B
and suggests that the real interest rate, which we can consider
here the main instrument of monetary policy, responds to GDP,
nonperforming loans, and inflation. 
We repeat the same analysis with the nominal interest rate
model and we obtain a causal graph identical to the one repre-
sented in Fig. 2 , except that RFFR is replaced with FFR . 
The results shown in Fig. 2 are in line with both the theo-
retical approaches we discussed above, namely the Taylor rule
and the Solvency rule. However, an analysis considering only the
contemporaneous relationships among the variables might not be
sufficient to capture the effects of monetary policy interventions. 
The dynamic causal effects are therefore studied through the
analysis of the impulse response functions, which show the (one
standard deviation) effect of a hypothetical intervention of one
variable, keeping the others constant, in a longer period. We thus
estimate the impulse response functions and the forecast variance
decomposition on the basis of the contemporaneous causal order
that results from LiNGAM, as represented in Fig. 2 , namely < GDP,
NPL, PI, RFFR > . The impulse response functions are displayed
in Fig. 3 . We show the dynamic effects until sixty quarters (i.e.
15 years). The plots show also the region delimited by 90% con-
fidence intervals, obtained through a bootstrap procedure with
10 0 0 iterations. 
The first column of Fig. 3 displays the effects of the (one
standard deviation) RFFR (real federal funds rate) shock. The
contemporaneous impact of RFFR on itself shows that the standardeviation of the structural RFFR shock is about 0.55. The RFFR
hock displays an effect on inflation (PI) that is not significant over
ime (second plot of the column). This suggest that an exogenous
ntervention on RFFR is not able to produce significant changes in
nflation. The effect of the RFFR shock on GDP is not significant
n the first three quarters and then becomes slightly negative and
ignificant in the subsequent quarters (third plot of the column).
hus RFFR has limited effects on output (around 0.5% in the long
un), but, in comparison, the effect of the RFFR shock on NPL is
uch greater (fourth plot of the column). Indeed an RFFR shock
ields (positively) until 10% changes in NPL after 20 periods. This
uggests the presence of a strong causal relationship from an
ntervention on RFFR to NPL in the short and medium run. 
The second column of Fig. 3 (second row) displays the effects
f the (one standard deviation) PI (inflation) shock. The contem-
oraneous impact of PI on itself shows that the standard deviation
f the structural PI shock is about 0.4. The effect of the PI shock
n RFFR is not significant over time (first plot of the column). The
ffects of PI on GDP is negative and on NPL are positive, but not
ignificant in the long run. 
The third column of Fig. 3 (third row) displays the effects
f the structural GDP shock, whose standard deviation is about
.008. As regards the effect of RFFR to GDP shock, it appears to
e mainly concentrated in the short run: a shock on GDP has
 positive and significant contemporaneous effect on RFFR, and
his effect remains significant for about ten periods becoming
mbiguous and insignificant later on (see first row, third column
lot). The response of inflation to the GDP shock is not significant
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B  second row, same column), while the response of NPL to GDP
s ambiguous and short lived: negative in the first two quarters,
ositive after 10 quarters and not significant in the long run
fourth row, same column). 
The fourth column of Fig. 3 (fourth row) displays the effects
f the (one standard deviation) NPL (nonperforming loans) shock.
he contemporaneous impact of NPL on itself shows that the
tandard deviation of the structural NPL shock is about 0.9. In
esponse to an NPL shock, the RFFR decreases between 5 and 10
uarters, confirming the role played by the solvency condition of
rms in monetary authorities’ decisions (first plot in the fourth
olumn).The effects of the NPL shock on inflation and GDP turn
ut not to be significant with few exceptions in the first periods. 
These results are strongly confirmed in the impulse response
unctions in which nominal interest rate model (FFR) is used in-
tead of RFFR. 
The results of forecast variance decomposition functions, shown
n Fig. 4 , are in line with the impulse response functions and con-
rm that NPL and GDP are the fluctuations dominant source of
FFR (see first plot in the first row of Fig. 4 ). We also find a
ignificant influence of RFFR on NPL (see last plot in the last row
f Fig. 4 ). Finally, we observe a modest contribution of RFFR to the
ariance of real GDP (see first plot in the last row of Fig. 4 ) and
 scarce contribution of PI to RFFR’s variance (see first plot in the
rst row of Fig. 4 ). Very similar results are found in the nominal
nterest rate model. 
We also inquired how robust the contemporaneous causal
tructure inferred from LiNGAM, from which structural impulse
esponse functions and forecast error variance decomposition also
epend, is under resampling. Thus, using a wild bootstrap proce-
ure (10 0 0 iterations), we checked how many times the LiNGAM
lgorithm was producing the contemporaneous causal structure
isplayed in Fig. 2 ), namely < GDP, NPL, PI, RFFR > . It turned
ut that 83% of the time the same structure was produced under
esampling and 15% of the time the output was a slightly different
tructure, namely < GDP, NPL, RFFR, PI > . This means that in
he contemporaneous causal order GDP and NPL (in this order) are
anked before the other two variables ( PI and RFFR ) 98% per cent of
he time. We conclude that the main causal findings of the paper
re therefore satisfactorily robust and the model is well identified. 
. Conclusions 
This paper proposes a statistical identification approach to
ssess the reliability of the ‘Taylor rule’ and the so-called ‘Sol-
ency rule’ for a description of U.S. monetary policy in the period
988–2016. On the basis of our analysis, it is possible to draw the
ollowing empirical results. 
First, the contemporaneous causal structure which has been
dentified (and is consistent across different specifications) sug-
ests that the monetary policy instrument — nominal or real
ederal funds rate — responds in the same period to changes of all
he variables considered: that is, not only real GDP and inflation
ut also nonperforming loans. 
Second, a temporary rise in real GDP tends to be followed by a
emporary increase of nominal or real funds rate. 
Third, the manner in which changes in the nominal or real
ederal funds rate affect GDP over time is not significant in the
rst year and significant after one year. Moreover, the response of
nflation to the federal funds rate is always not significant. 
Fourth, we identify a positive and significant causal relation
rom changes in the federal funds rate to immediately subsequent
hanges in nonperforming loans. Furthermore, after a change
n the nominal or real interest rate, an impact of the same
ign on nonperforming loans remains substantially relevant and
tatistically significant for more than 30 periods (about 7 years). The empirical analysis seems to confirm the conventional idea
hat the monetary authority sets the interest rate taking into con-
ideration the values of inflation and GDP; it suggests nonetheless
hat central bank’s decisions over the rate of interests are also
nfluenced by nonperforming loans. At the same time, the results
ut into question a crucial part of the Taylor rule in all of its spec-
fications: although the interest rate may significantly affect GDP
fter one year, it is not able to affect inflation in any time lapse
onsidered. Furthermore, as we found out that the interest rate af-
ects the amount of nonperforming loans with a positive influence,
ur analysis seems not to be consistent with the “leaning against
he wind” policy which is implicit in the “augmented Taylor rule”,
hereas it seems to provide support to the alternative monetary
olicy interpretation suggested by the “Solvency rule”. To sum up,
he results of the present work point to a general interpretation
f the behaviour of the central bank which questions the view
mplicit in the Taylor rule and its augmented variants,while could
e compatible with an alternative view inspired by Kaldor’s inter-
retation of the Radcliffe Report and synthesized in the “Solvency
ule” ( Brancaccio and Fontana, 2013; 2016; Brancaccio and Suppa,
018 ). In fact, empirical evidence seems to be in line with the idea
hat the main role of the central bank, rather than being primarily
oncerned with the prior task of output and price stabilization,
oncerns a regulation of the financial positions of the economic
nits, making interest rates more or less sustainable for debtors
n order to manage the stability and the solvency conditions
n the economic system. This result suggests a very different
iew of monetary policy from that proposed by the advocates
f ”neutrality”. The action of central banks, apparently, seems to
e “anti-neutral”, not only with regard to the usual management
f the business cycle but also and above all in relation to the
olvency conditions in the economic system (for a possible related
iew, see also Cardinale and Scazzieri, 2016 p. 50 n. 10). This
vidence offers new elements to support the thesis that through
he regulation of solvency, monetary policy can affect the pace
f bankruptcies, liquidations and therefore also acquisitions and
ergers between capitals, i.e. it can intervene on the rhythm of
he so-called “centralization of capital” ( Brancaccio et al., 2019 ). 
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